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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950431-CA 
v. : 
KIP LANE MASSEY, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for 
a new trial after a jury convicted him for theft by receiving 
stolen property, a second degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995), and for selling a firearm to a juvenile, 
a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-509.9 
(1995) (R. 64-65). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion for new 
trial based on his claim that a jury should hear the co-
defendant's live confession to the same crime even though the 
trial court admitted co-defendant's hearsay confession at 
defendant's trial? 
The trial court has a "wide range of discretion in 
determining" whether to grant a motion for a new trial. State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991). This Court assumes the 
trial court properly exercised its discretion "unless the record 
clearly shows the contrary." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ANP RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 
(1995) and 76-10-509.9 (1995), and Utah R. Crim. P. 24. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant and Casey Sanslow with theft by 
receiving stolen property, a second degree felony, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995), and with selling a firearm to a 
juvenile, a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-509.9 (1995) (R. 4-5). Although the record contains no 
severance order, separate courts handled defendant's and Casey's 
cases. 
A jury convicted defendant of the charged crimes (R. 64-65). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to the statutory prison terms 
of one to fifteen years on the theft conviction and zero to five 
years on the firearm sale conviction, suspended both sentences, 
and placed defendant on 24-months probation (R. 78-80) . 
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Defendant filed a motion for new trial (R. 84-85), which the 
trial court denied (R. 107-108). Defendant timely appealed from 
the denial of his motion (R. 109-10). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 19, 1994, someone burglarized Terry Sanlow's home 
and stole his .22 caliber Derringer (R. 200-202) . Terry is co-
defendant Casey Sanslow's father (R. 200). 
On June 21, 1994, Grant Kirby purchased the stolen .22 
Derringer from defendant (R. 210, 213-14, 217, 245-46) . Grant 
was fifteen at the time (R. 208). Grant's brother Travis was 
present at the sale (R. 245). Travis was seventeen at the time 
(R. 242). 
When police stopped Grant and another brother, Greg, in 
August 1994, they discovered the stolen gun (R. 218, 267). Grant 
told the police that defendant sold him the gun (R. 219, 269-71). 
On August 29, 1994, police interrogated defendant about the 
gun sale (R. 281-82). Defendant denied ever seeing the Derringer 
before or knowing about a stolen gun or the burglary in at Terry 
Sanslow's home (R. 283-84). 
However, in a written statement given the next day, 
defendant stated that Casey had told him about the burglary, and 
that Casey had sold the gun to Grant Kirby (R. 291). At trial, 
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defendant testified that Casey admitted taking the gun from his 
father's house approximately one week before the burglary, and 
that Casey told him that Casey had sold the gun to Travis Kirby 
(R. 337, 342). 
On August 30, 1994, after defendant gave police his written 
statement, police interrogated Casey Sanslow (R. 286-87, 294) . 
Casey gave police a written statement as follows: 
I, Casey Sanslow, had in my possession on June 21st a 
little .22 handgun which I sold to the Kirby twins for 
$35 with a gun case, and Kip Massey was not and had 
nothing to do with it. At the time I did know that it 
was stolen gun. 
(R. 295-96). One of the investigating officers read that 
confession to the jury (id.). The officer also testified that 
Casey had always maintained that he committed the crime and that 
defendant knew nothing about it (R. 288-90, 311) . 
The argument section contains additional relevant facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant moved for a new trial in order to call Casey 
Sanslow to testify and confess to the crime. The trial court 
denied the motion because the jury that convicted defendant heard 
Casey's hearsay confession. This Court should affirm that 
decision. First, defendant waived his appellate claim because, 
when he moved for a continuance to obtain Casey's attendance, he 
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told the trial court that the hearsay confession would suffice. 
Second, the proposed live testimony, although providing slightly 
more detail than the hearsay confession, added nothing to the 
substance of the evidence presented to the convicting jury: that 
Casey admitted responsibility for the crime and denied 
defendant's involvement. Third, the proposed live testimony 
would not have added enough more detail to make a different 
outcome on retrial reasonably probable. Each of these bases 
independently requires affirming the denial of defendant's 
motion. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS APPELLATE CLAIM; ALTERNATIVELY, 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL TO HAVE CASEY TESTIFY BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
ADMITTED CASEY'S OUT-OF-COURT CONFESSION 
Defendant claims that the trial court should have granted a 
new trial so that Casey could have testified to confess to the 
crimes. Two days prior to trial, defendant requested a 
continuance to permit Casey to testify (R. 98-101). Defendant 
told the trial court that Casey had signed a written statement 
claiming that defendant had no involvement, and that Casey was 
therefore a necessary witness (R. 99-100). Defendant also told 
the court that Casey would not enter his plea on the same charges 
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until April 17 and would assert his Fifth Amendment privilege if 
called to testify before pleading (R. 99). 
The trial court denied the motion for continuance (R. 101). 
Defendant has not appealed that ruling (R. 109-110). The trial 
court admitted Casey's out-of-court confession (R. 295-96). 
After the jury convicted him, defendant moved the trial 
court for a new trial so that Casey, who had pleaded guilty by 
that time, could testify before a jury (R. 84-85, 462). 
Defendant submitted an affidavit outlining Casey's proposed live 
testimony (R. 103-105). A copy of the affidavit is attached as 
addendum B. In the affidavit, Casey again accepted 
responsibility for the crimes and exonerated defendant (R. 104). 
In addition, the affidavit testimony contains a few more details. 
For example, Casey more specifically identified the gun as a 
Derringer and testified that he sold to Travis Kirby rather than 
"the Kirby twins (R. 103-104, 295-96). Defendant argued that 
Casey's proposed live testimony would provide "just some basic 
impeachment material" (R. 464). 
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The trial court denied the motion, ruling: 
Given fact that the Court allowed the confession in of 
the Co-defendant and apparently is consistent with what 
you indicated his testimony would be, it gets to be an 
issue of credibility. The Court will deny the motion 
for a new trial 
(R. 468). 
A trial court may "grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party." Utah R. 
Crim. P 24(a). In order to require a new trial, Casey's evidence 
must meet three criteria: Ml) it must be such as could not with 
reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the 
trial; (2) it must not be merely cumulative; and (3) it must be 
such as to render a different result probable on the retrial of 
the case." State v. Jiron. 882 P.2d 685, 689 (Utah App. 1994), 
cert- denied, 892 p.2d 13, (Utah 1995). 
The trial court had a "wide range of discretion in 
determining" whether Casey's post-trial availability warranted a 
new trial. State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991). This 
Court assumes the trial court properly exercised its discretion 
"unless the record clearly shows the contrary." Id. 
Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously denied 
his motion. Essentially, defendant argues that the trial court 
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should have granted his motion because Casey was unavailable to 
testify at the time of trial and the hearsay confession could not 
substitute for Casey's live testimony. 
Defendants appellate claim fails for three reasons, each of 
which independently defeats it: 1) defendant waived his claim 
that he was entitled to Casey's live testimony; 2) Casey's 
proposed live testimony was merely cumulative of the hearsay 
confession; and 3) Casey's live testimony does not render a 
different result on retrial probable. 
A. Defendant waived his appellate claim. 
When the State opposed the continuance and the trial court 
asked defense counsel if she would be prepared to try the case on 
the scheduled date, defense counsel responded: 
Your Honor, we are aware of the problem that the 
co-defendant has, however I have no control over when 
he enters his plea or not. 
If that's the case, Your Honor, we'd be making a motion 
that he be at least declared unavailable so we can use his 
statement. 
* * * * 
That he be declared unavailable so we can use his 
statement. I believe it's 803 or 4, that if a defendant or 
a witness is going to take the Fifth Amendment, we can have 
him declared unavailable. If we can do that, I'd have no 
problem continuing -- going forward on Thursday. 
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(R. 100)(emphasis added). The trial court ultimately admitted 
the written confession (R. 295-96). 
Defendant did not complain about the trial court's selection 
of admitting the confession rather than delaying the trial until 
after the jury convicted him (R. 99-101). When defendant told 
the trial court that he could proceed if he could use the hearsay 
confession, he conditionally waived any claim that only Casey's 
live confession would suffice. When the trial court admitted the 
hearsay confession, it complied with the contingency and the 
waiver became complete. Defendant cannot complain on appeal that 
the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a new trial to 
hear live testimony when he waived that claim by previously 
telling the trial court that live testimony would be unnecessary 
if he could use the hearsay confession. Cf. State v. Medina, 73 8 
P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) (defendant could not accept a jury 
instruction, then challenge it on appeal). 
B. Casey's testimony was cumulative. 
The trial court denied the motion because it found that 
Casey would have testified consistently with the hearsay 
confession admitted at trial (R. 468); in other words, that 
Casey's live testimony would have been merely cumulative to the 
hearsay confession. 
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The record does not clearly establish that the trial court 
abused its discretion in making this determination. In the 
hearsay confession that the trial court admitted, Casey admitted 
committing the same crimes with which the State charged defendant 
and denied that defendant had any involvement (R. 4-5, 295-96). 
In addition, the investigating officer testified that Casey 
always maintained that he, not defendant, sold the gun to the 
Kirbys (R. 288-290, 311). Because the hearsay confession and 
Casey's proposed live testimony provided the same substantive 
evidence, the trial court correctly concluded that the proposed 
live testimony was cumulative. 
Defendant contends that the greater detail in Casey's 
proposed live testimony would have given greater "credibility" to 
Casey's confession and consequently to defendant's defense; 
therefore, according to defendant, the live testimony was not 
cumulative. Appellant's Brief at 18-19. When a trial court 
denies a motion for new trial based on the discovery of new 
credibility evidence, the denial generally does not warrant 
reversal. State v. Worthen. 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 
1988)(evidence that had minor impeachment value did not justify a 
new trial). See also. State v. James, 819 P.2d at 794 (dicta). 
Even if Casey's live testimony would provide greater detail, the 
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extra detail does not make the live confession non-cumulative of 
the hearsay one. The extra detail went to peripheral matters, 
like corroborating that defendant had never seen the Derringer, 
specifically identifying Travis Kirby as the buyer, and 
specifically identifying the .22 pistol as a Derringer. However, 
the hearsay confession provided the important information: Casey 
insisted that he committed the crimes and that defendant had no 
knowledge of them. The trial court properly concluded that the 
proposed live testimony was cumulative. Cf. State v. Goddard. 
871 P,2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994) (trial court properly denied motion 
for new trial where Goddard's proposed new witness's testimony 
was not sufficiently inconsistent with evidence at trial). 
Defendant relies on State v. James to suggest that live 
testimony can never be cumulative of hearsay evidence. 
Appellant's Brief at 17. James does not support that 
proposition. In James, the defense discovered a witness who 
would testify that one of the State's key witnesses perjured 
himself when he testified that he overheard James confess to 
another inmate that James had killed his son. State v. James, 
819 P.2d at 793. James moved for a new trial on the basis of 
newly discovered evidence. Id. The trial court found that the 
new witness's testimony was merely cumulative of defendant's 
11 
denial that he made the confession. Id. at 794. The supreme 
court reversed, holding that the evidence was not cumulative, but 
was "independent evidence which corroborated defendant's 
statements." Id. at 795. 
In James the jury heard no testimony, live or otherwise, 
corroborating James' testimony. In this case, the jury heard 
hearsay testimony corroborating defendant's testimony. James 
does not require that the jury hear the corroborating evidence 
from the declarant. Because the jury heard the corroborating 
evidence in this case, the trial court correctly concluded that 
Casey's live confession would be merely cumulative of his hearsay 
confession. 
C. Casey's live testimony does not make a different result 
probable on retrial-
Defendant has not shown that Casey's live testimony would 
succeed where his hearsay confession failed. Defendant contends 
that the additional detail in Casey's proposed live testimony 
would prevent the State from exploiting the lack of detail in the 
hearsay confession to challenge the confession's credibility. 
Appellant's Brief at 18-19. 
Defendant's argument refers to the State's closing argument 
challenging the hearsay confession because: 1) Casey did not 
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describe the gun very well, suggesting that perhaps he was 
thinking of another gun sale; and 2) Casey incorrectly referred 
to Grant and Travis as twins (R. 408-409). That Casey's proposed 
live testimony cures these two problems does not make a different 
outcome probable on retrial. 
First, the additional details would not prevent the State 
from challenging Casey's credibility. The prosecutor could use 
the added detail to suggest that Casey had used the time between 
his written statement and defendant's conviction to coordinate 
his story to mirror defendant's trial testimony. The added 
detail could make the proposed live testimony less credible, not 
more. 
Second, defendant's argument ignores the other evidence 
bolstering the statement's credibility. For example, the 
investigating officer stated that Casey consistently maintained 
his guilt and defendant's innocence (R. 288-90, 311). Moreover, 
defense counsel reinforced the confession's credibility by 
pointing out that Casey had no motive to lie and gained nothing 
by confessing (R. 409-410, 415). Despite defense counsel's 
argument and the officer's testimony, the jury convicted 
defendant. The additional detail in Casey's proposed live 
testimony would not render a different result. See State v. 
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Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994)(proposed new rebuttal 
witness's testimony did not make a different result probable 
where her testimony was not sufficiently inconsistent with the 
evidence presented). 
Finally, defendant's argument ignores the other evidence of 
defendant's guilt. Grant and Travis consistently identified 
defendant as the one who sold Grant the Derringer (R. 213-14, 
217, 246, 270-71). The investigating officers testified that 
neither boy ever changed his story about who sold them the gun 
(R. ??) . Defendant admitted that the Kirbys had no reason to 
falsely identify him, although he did speculate that they may 
have falsely identified him out of revenge for defendant evicting 
a tenant defendant claimed supplied the Kirbys with drugs (R. 
352) . 
Moreover, defendant's inconsistent statements deteriorated 
his credibility. Defendant first denied ever seeing the 
Derringer before or knowing about a stolen gun or the burglary in 
Carbon County (R. 283-84). Later, defendant stated that Casey had 
told him about the burglary, and that Casey had sold the gun to 
Grant Kirby (R. 291). At trial, defendant testified that Casey 
admitted taking the gun from his father's house approximately one 
week before the burglary, and that Casey told him that Casey had 
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sold the gun to Travis Kirby, not Grant Kirby (R. 337, 352). As 
defendant increasingly exonerated himself at Casey's expense, and 
as the story altered to make it less consistent with the Kirbys' 
testimony, defendant deteriorated the credibility of his own and 
Casey's denial that he had any involvement in the crimes. That 
Casey may have more specifically identified the gun and the Kirby 
brother to whom he sold it if the trial court had allowed him to 
testify at a retrial would not sufficiently rehabilitate 
defendant's own credibility to make a different outcome probable. 
Moreover, defendant's contention that allowing the jury to 
see Casey would render a different result probable is highly 
speculative. Relying on the hearsay confession precluded the 
State from cross-examining Casey and undermining his confession. 
Presenting only the hearsay confession may have been a windfall 
to defendant. 
In sum, defendant waived his claim that the trial court 
should have given him a new trial to allow Casey's live 
confession testimony when he had previously told the trial court 
that the hearsay confession would serve as well. Alternatively, 
Casey's proposed live testimony was cumulative and not shown to 
be sufficiently compelling to make a different result probable. 
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Therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for 
a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argue above, the State requests that the 
Court affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a 
new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of Augtlst /f *76 
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Attorney General 
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THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
397 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 24 
determined to be illegal or unauthorized, 87 
A-LJEUth 384. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 977 to 
996. 
Rule 23. Arrest of judgment. 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own 
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the 
facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is 
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon 
arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the of-
fense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until 
the defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may 
be just and proper under the circumstances. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Challenge to jurisdiction. 
Grounds. 
Mental illness. 
Prosecutorial misconduct. 
Standard. 
Variance between charge and verdict. 
Cited. 
Challenge to jurisdiction. 
Jurisdictional question was properly raised 
by motion in arrest of judgment. State v. Mer-
ritt, 67 Utah 325, 247 P. 497 (1926). 
Grounds. 
A judgment may be arrested based on an in-
sufficiency of the evidence or facts as proved in 
trial or as admitted by the parties. State v. 
Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
affd, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993). 
An arrest of judgment is appropriate where 
the -verdict is based on inherently improbable 
evidence. State v. Workman. 806 P.2d 1198 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), affd, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 
1993). 
Mental illness. 
Where an alienist specifically found defen-
dant competent to proceed to sentencing, trial 
court did not err in refusing to arrest judgment 
despite the fact that defendant may have suf-
fered from an undetermined mental illness. 
State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988). 
Prosecutorial misconduct 
Prosecutorial misconduct before- trial was 
grounds for a new trial, not an arrest of judg-
ment, even though defendant's motion for ar-
rest of judgment or in the alternative for a new 
trial was made before imposition of sentence. 
State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct App. 
1988). 
Standard. 
A trial court may arrest a jury verdict when 
the evidence, viewed in the light most favor-
able to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so in-
herently improbable as to an element of the 
crime that reasonable minds must have enter-
tained a reasonable doubt as to that element, 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983); 
State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982); 
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976); 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993). 
Variance between charge and verdict 
Although the verdict form signed by the jury 
foreman stated that the defendant was guilty 
of "forcible sexual assault" and the information 
had charged the defendant with "aggravated 
sexual assault," the variance did not justify the 
granting of a motion to arrest judgment on the 
basis of uncertainty as to what the jury in-
tended; an error on the jury verdict form does 
not create uncertainty per se, and there was no 
reason to doubt that the jury intended to find 
the defendant guilty as charged. State v. Gen-
try, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987). 
Cited in State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 
(Utah 1989); State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264 
(Utah 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am* Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal 
Law §§ 520 to 524. 
C.J.S. — 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law i 1453 et 
seq. 
AJLR. — Coram nobis on ground of other's 
confession to crime, 46 A.L.R.4th 468. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law •» 974 to 
976. 
Rule 24. Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant 
a new triaHn the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
Rule 24 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 398 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of 
sentence, or within such further time as the court may GJL during the ten-day 
period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned 
either in evidence or in argument. 
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Absence of witness. 
Where the evidence was discovered before 
trial but the witness was absent, not only must 
diligence have been shown in attempting to ob-
tain the testimony of such witness, but an ap-
plication must have been made to obtain" a 
postponement of the trial so as to give opportu-
nity to obtain such witness or evidence before 
defendant might avail himself of a motion for a 
new trial on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence. State v. Weaver, 78 Utah 555,6 P.2d 
167 (1931). 
Defendant was not entitled to a new trial to 
produce a witness who was unavailable At trial 
where witness' absence was not due to any 
error or impropriety at trial, but was due to 
attendance at an out-of-town convention, and 
defendant did not ask for a new trial date or a 
continuance to accommodate the witness' cal-
endar. State v. Gehring, 694 F.2d 599 (Utah 
1984). 
Affidavits of jurors. 
Verdict of guilty of larceny of sheep which 
recommended leniency was not a chance ver-
dict, and could not be impeached by affidavits 
of eight jurors that they would not have voted 
defendant guilty if they thought he would 
thereby receive a jail sentence. State v. Priest-
ley, 97 Utah 158, 91 P.2d 447 (1939). 
Motion for new trial following rape convic-
tion on ground of misconduct of jury was prop-
erly denied, notwithstanding affidavits of four 
jurors filed in support of motion reciting that 
they were in favor of acquittal on first ballot 
but that, as (me of jurors stated that if they 
found defendant guilty with recommendation 
of leniency he would have to serve only a few 
months in jail, they thereupon were persuaded 
to vote for conviction,-where affidavits showed 
no coercion or tacti& which might have 
stripped any juror of his ability to act in accor-
dance with his honest convictions. State v. 
Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973 (1947). 
Jurors could not impeach their verdicts ex-
cept in instance! expressly made exceptions by 
legislative enactments and, where a defendant 
submitted affidavits of two jurors to the affect 
that, if the record did not support the conclu-
sion of the state's expert witness then these 
two jurors would not have voted for the verdict 
such affidavits were conditional and would be 
of no avail to the defendant where the verdict 
was justified by the record. State v. 
Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355 P.2d 689 
(1960), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 144, 82 S. 
Ct 247, 7 L. E i 2d 188, cert denied, 368 U.S. 
922, 82 S. Ct 246, 7 L Ed. 2d 137 (1961). 
A juror's allegation that she misunderstood 
the rule of law pertinent to unanimity would 
not compel the court to grant a new trial where 
the jury had been properly instructed on that 
point State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981). 
Bias or prejudice of jurors. 
Where in a first degree murder prosecution, 
a juror falsely stated, on his voir dire, that he 
had neither expressed nor formed an opinion 
concerning the case, and fact that he had pre-
judged defendant was not known to the defen-
dant or his attorneys until after trial, the de-
fendant would be grafted a new trial. State v. 
Morgan, 23 Utah 212, 64 P. 356 (1901). 
Where in a first degree murder prosecution, 
the admitted facts showed both actual and im-
plied bias of two of the jurors, there was suffi-
cient ground for granting the defendant a new 
trial. State v. Morgan, 23 Utah 212, 64 P. 356 
(1901). 
It was ground for granting a defendant a 
new trial where juror, who, on his voir dire, 
stared that he knew of no reason why he should 
not sit in case, was a stockholder, director, and 
debtor of corporation whose store the defen-
dant was convicted of having burglarised, 
where neither the defendant nor his attorney 
knew of such juror's lack of impartiality until 
after the trial. State v. Thompson, 24 Utah 
314, 67 P. 789 (1902). 
Previously expressed bias of a juror, falsely 
denied on his voir dire, and unknown to the 
defendant or his attorney until after the trial, 
warranted granting of a new trial State v. 
Mickle, 25 Utah 179, 70 P. 85641902). 
Statement of jury foreman after verdict in 
rape case, that "it is a wonder these boys are 
still alive," did not require new trial on ground 
that it showed prejudice or that juror had se-
cured information outside court, where state* * 
ment might have been conclusion based on evi-
dence submitted to jury at trial. State v. Brink-
man, 68 Utah 557, 251 P. 364 (1926). 
In murder prosecution, court did not abuse 
its discretion in refusing to grant motion for 
new trial on ground that juror wss disqualified 
as having determined guilt of defendant before 
trial. State v. Draper, 63 Utah 115,27 P-2d 39 
(1933). 
In a riot prosecution where the defendant 
subsequent to trial found that a juror was dtp-
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(2) Any person who violates this section is guilty of: 
(a) a class A misdemeanor upon the first offense; and 
(b) a third degree felony for each subsequent offense. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-509.6, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 10, § 7 
L. 1993 (2nd S.S.), ch-10, ft 4. makes the act effective on October 21,1993. 
76-10-509.7. Parent or guardian knowing of minor's pos-
session of dangerous weapon. 
Any parent or guardian of a minor who knows that the minor is in possession 
of a dangerous weapon in violation of Section 76-10-509 or a firearm in 
violation of Section 76-10-509.4 and fails to make reasonable efforts to remove 
the firearm from the minor's possession is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10^509.7, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 10, § 7 
L. 1993 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, 5 5. makes the act effective on October 21,1993. 
76-10-509.9. Sales of firearms to juveniles. 
(1) A person may not sell any firearm to a minor under 18 years of age unless 
the minor is accompanied by a parent or guardian. 
(2) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a third degree felony. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-509.9, enacted by ch. 13, § 2 makes the act effective on October 
L. 1993 (2nd S.S.), ch* 13, J 1. 21,1993. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993 (2nd S.S.), 
76-10-510. Possession of weapon authorized — Permit or 
license not required. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to prohibit a citizen of the-United 
States or a lawftilly admitted alien over the age of eighteen years who resides 
or is temporarily within this state and who is not within the excepted classes 
as prescribed by Section 76-10-503 from owning, possessing, or ~;:epihg within 
his place of residence or place of business or any vehicle under ms control any 
pistol, revolver, or other firearm or dangerous weapon capable of being 
concealed upon the person, and no permit or license to purchase, own, possess, 
or to keep any such firearm or weapon at his place of residence, or place of 
business, or any vehicle under his control, shall-be required of him. 
History: C. 1953,76-10-510, enacted byX. ment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "or a 
1973, ch. 196, t 76-10-510; 1991, ch. 17, 9 2. lawfully admitted alien* near the beginning. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons and business, 57 A.LR.3d 938. 
Firearms § 31. Validity of state gun control legislation under 
C.J.S. — 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 11. gtate constitutional provisions securing the 
A U L — Scope and effect of exception, in right to bear arms, 86 A.L.R.4th 931. 
statute forbidding carrying of weapons, as to
 K e y Numbers. — Weapons *=> 12. 
person on his own premises or at his place of 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d, — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 18. 
§ 101. Key Numbers. — Larceny <s» 10. 
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbro-
kers. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
intending to deprive the owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the 
case of an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a 
separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the 
receiving offense charged; 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed, 
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable 
value; or 
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or 
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or 
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or 
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains 
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the 
-property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the 
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identifica-
tion. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in 
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every 
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to 
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to have 
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or 
unlawfiilly obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence 
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a 
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal 
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or 
person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the 
property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2Xd), then 
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought, 
received, or obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2)(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as 
defined in Section 76-10-901. 
(6) As used in-this section: 
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on 
the security of the property; 
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(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-408, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-408; 1979, ch. 71, § 1; 
1993, ch. 102, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective May 3, 1993, substituted aSub-_ 
section" for "paragraph* in Subsection (2), sub-
divided Subsection (2)(d), moved uif the value 
given for the property exceeds $20* which was 
formerly in Subsection (2Xd)(i) to the introduc-
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Applicability. 
-Elements. 
—Concealing stolen property. 
—Receiving stolen property. 
Entrapment. 
Evidence. 
Intent 
Prima facie case. 
Separate offenses. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
The presumption created in Subsection (2) is 
constitutional when read in light-of § 76-1-503, 
which provides that a presumption means only 
that the issue of the -presumed fact must be 
submitted to the jury unless its existence is 
clearly negated and that the jury may treat 
proof of the underlying facts as evidence of the 
presumed fact, but does not disturb the require-
ment that the presumed fact, like all other 
elements of the crime, must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Mullins, 549 P.2d 454 
(Utah 1976). 
- The phrase "believing that "it probably has 
been stolen* in" Subsection (1), while not a 
model of draftsmanship, is not unconstitution-
ally vague. State v. Plum, 552 P.2d 124 (Utah 
1976). 
Applicability. 
The plain meaning of Subsection (2Xd) limits 
its application to pawnbrokers and similar 
businesses that generally deal in small pur-
chases of secondhand consumer goods. It does 
not include businesses that regularly deal in 
large bulk orders of raw industrial material. 
Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 
1993). 
Elements. 
Concealing stolen-property. 
The elements in the-crime of concealing or 
aiding in the concealment of stolen property 
are: (1) property belonging to another has been 
tory language, inserted "picture* in Subsection 
(2)(d)(iii), redesignated former Subsections 
(2)(d)(i) and (ii) as Subsections (3) and (4), 
inserted Subsection (5), making a correspond-
ing designation change, and made stylistic 
changes. 
Cross-References. — Pawnbrokers and sec-
ondhand dealers, § 11-6-1 et seq. 
stolen; (2) the defendant aided in concealing 
this property; (3) at the time he so aided in 
concealing it he knew the item had been stolen; 
and (4) his purpose in acting was to deprive the 
owner thereof of possession. State v. Lamm, 606 
P.2d 229 (Utah 1980). 
—Receiving stolen property. 
Elements of the crime of receiving stolen 
property are: property belonging to another has 
been stolen; the defendant received, retained or 
disposed of the stolen property; at the time of 
receiving, retaining or disposing of the property 
the defendant knew or believed the property 
was stolen; and the defendant acted purposely 
to deprive the owneFof the possession of the 
property. State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (Utah 
1980). 
Time of the alleged offense is not an essential 
element of the crime of receiving stolen prop-
erty; state's proof that offense occurred on a 
date different than that alleged in the informa-
tion was not fatal to defendant's conviction for 
receiving stolen property where the applicable 
limitations statute had not run at the time the 
charge was filed. State v. Wilson, 642 P.2d 394 
(Utah 1982). 
In order to obtain a conviction for theft by 
receiving, the state must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt each of the following elements: 
(1) The defendant received, retained, or dis-
posed of the property of another, (2) knowing 
that the property had been stolen or believing 
that it probably had been stolen, (3) with the 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof. State v. 
Hill, 727 P.2d 221 (Utah 1986). 
Entrapment. 
Trial court properly found entrapment in a 
"sting" operation involving use-of an attractive 
female undercover police officer to sell stolen 
merchandise to a jewelry store owner who may 
have been encouraged to suggest that his rela-
tionship with the officer become more intimate. 
State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987). 
Evidence. 
Evidence establishing receiving stolen prop-
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KIMBERLY A. CLARK, #5454 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
RLED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
8y 
JUL 2 8 1995 
OEPUN cifiw 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KIP LANE MASSEY, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CASEY SANSLOW 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 951900059FS 
JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
: SS. 
) 
CASEY SANSLOW, being first duly swom upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I was charged in this case along with Kip Lane Massey. 
2. I hired Randy Ludlow to represent me. 
3. The weekend before this offense occurred, I was In Price, Utah, visiting my father, 
Terry Sanslow. 
4. While I was staying at my father's house, I took the 2.25 caliber Derringer pistol 
from his collection, and brought It to Salt Lake with me. 
5. The following week, my mother told me that my father's home had been broken 
into and all his guns had been stolen. I was worried that I would be blamed for 
flfiflffl* 
breaking into my father's house if I were found with the Derringer, so I decided to get 
rid of it. 
6. 1 went over to Kip Massey's house to meet with him and he wasn't home. I met 
someone on the porch by the name of Travis Kirby and asked him If he wanted to 
purchase the gun. I sold the gun to Mr. Kirby at that time for $30.00. 
7. Kip was not at home when I sold the gun to Travis Kirby. Kip did not see the 
gun, because I did not show it to him. 
8. Kip told me that a detective with the Murray Police was looking for me. I called 
him the same day and went into the police station. While I was there, I signed a 
statement telling the police that I sold the gun to the Kirby's and that Kip had nothing 
to do with It. 
9. I entered into a plea bargain with the District Attorney's Office to plead guilty to 
a third degree felony on this case, before Judge Tyrone E. Medley on April 17, 
1995. 
10. I was subpoenaed to testify at Kip Massey's trial which was to begin on April 13, 
1995. I was advised by my attorney, Randy Ludlow, to invoke my fifth amendment 
right against self-incrimination If I were called to testify. 
11. I have since entered a plea on this case, have been sentenced and am now 
available to testify. 
DATED this £]( day of ]uly, 1995. 
C A S ^ 
•0-0'01:04 
Subscribed to and sworn to before me thispn day of ]uly, 1995. 
My Commission Expires =1M/ 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake District Attorney's 
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 this day of July, 1995. 
••0'«W»5 
